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Abstract
The Global Positioning System (GPS) has become an important asset in the lives of
civilians and defense organizations. GPS uses include positioning, navigation, timing, as
well as many other daily applications. With such dependence, protection against attacks
on the system is paramount to continue its effectiveness. Attacks on its signal is the
easiest way for enemies to degrade and harm not only everyday functioning for civilians,
but a nation’s defense as well. Jamming interference and spoofing are the two most
frequent attacks on GPS signals. Could these two attacks cause significant effect on
military operations? We use a System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS) model
to emulate a special operation force (SOF) using GPS recovering a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) against an opposing military in an urban canyon environment.
Simulating jamming (modeled as availability and accuracy) and spoofing (modeled as
timeliness) of the GPS satellites’ signal produces a greater understanding of its impact on
this type of operation. Statistical analysis determined the significance of these types of
attacks on several responses for this simulation. Our results include a designed
experiment capturing how individual model factors representing spoofing and jamming
can degrade GPS performance, and the subsequent impact on mission operations through
selected MOEs for the scenario modeled.
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STATISTICAL OBSERVATIONS OF POSITIONING, NAVIGATION, AND
TIMING IN A COMBAT SIMULATION
I. Introduction
Imagine a situation where a well-placed smart bomb could end a bloody and
expensive conflict. The target is placed near a civilian structure where a miss could cause
serious non-combatant damage resulting in moral and political fallout. Spoofing and
jamming of Global Positioning System (GPS) signals could relegate the smart bomb to an
inelegant piece of shrapnel without regard for location or consequences.
GPS has become as important as any functioning system used today. With many
uses, it has become irreplaceable for civilian to military users alike.
1.1 Background of the Study
The GPS is broken down into three components: space, control, and user. The space
portion is made up of 32 operational satellites. The US has a consensus effort to maintain
at least 24 operational GPS satellites, 95% of the time. These satellites orbit in the
medium Earth orbit (MEO) circling Earth twice a day. [1]
The next component is the control component. This component is broken down into
the Master Control Station (MCS), the monitor stations, and the ground antennas. The
MCS, placed at Colorado Springs, CO, is the central control node for the GPS satellite
constellation. It is responsible for all parts of constellation command and control. The
monitor stations, located around the world, continuously collect GPS data, which is then
routed back to the MCS and merged with other parameters to generate the Navigation
1

Message. Each satellite is seen from at least three monitor stations, allowing for
improved system accuracy. The final portion of the control component is the ground
antennas. They uplink satellite orbits (ephemerides) and clock correction information
within the Navigation Message and command telemetry from the MCS back to the
satellites. The information is updated at least daily. [2]
For this study, attacks against GPS are limited to spoofing and jamming. These
attacks target GPS codes, Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code for civilians, and the restricted
Precision (P) code for military usage. It is easier to attack the C/A code (1023 bits long)
with its 1.023 Mbit/s repeating every millisecond compared to the P code (6.1871 x 1012
bits long) with its 10.23 Mbit/s repeating once a week. [3]
Spoofing is misleading the receiver with fake signals for positioning calculations,
which result in an increase in measured distance. There are three classifications of
spoofing attacks. The most basic is the simplistic spoof. This uses a GPS signal
simulator and transmitter to overload another GPS receiver with the original and spoofed
signal. The intermediate spoof synchronizes a generated GPS signal with current GPS
broadcast satellite signals in view [4]. It attacks each channel of the receiver and forces
the tracking loops to lock on to the spoofed signals. Sophisticated spoofing, using
multiple transmitting antennas, spoofs the current broadcast satellites in addition to
spoofing other spoofers’ signals. [5]
The easier of the two attacks due to the weak power of GPS signals is jamming
interference. Jamming interference is comprised of impulse train, single and multi-tone
Continuous Wave (CW), frequency-hop and linear chirp CW. Its main purpose is to
2

prevent the receiving and/or sending of signals. A signal jammer sends a noisy signal on
the same frequency to the targeted GPS unit preventing transfer of information.
1.2 Problem Definition
GPS is such an important aspect of the daily lives of not only civilians, but also more
for military personnel, attacks against its infrastructure could cause catastrophic damage
against not only the user, but others as well. This paper studies the impact of GPS
manipulation caused by jamming and spoofing methods with the aid of computer
simulation. The objective of the study is to answer the following questions:
•

What has a higher effect on a GPS mission, jamming or spoofing?

•

Can a predictive model be established for Measures of Effectiveness?

1.3 Scope
Simulation is the tool used for this research. To answer the problem definition, an
established model used to observe PNT is utilized. This model uses the System
Effectiveness and Analysis Simulation (SEAS) pitting a blue force versus a red force.
Data retrieved from this scenario is analyzed using statistical techniques to determine the
answers to the problem definition.
1.4 Thesis Overview
The following chapters are the Literature Review, Methodology, Analysis, and
Conclusions. The Literature Review discusses related studies about GPS, spoofing,
jamming, and simulation. The Methodology chapter discusses the analysis technique that
3

is employed. The simulation model in detail and the statistical approaches that are used
for better understanding the model. Chapter 4 presents the data obtained from running
the simulation using the statistical method of Design of Experiments method. It looks to
answer the questions posed in the problem definition. The final chapter looks to
conclude the work by summarizing the methodology and analysis. It also recommends
improvements and future research opportunities.
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II. Review of Related Studies and Literature
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a brief background from open source material on spoofing,
jamming, simulation, and statistical design of experiments as they apply to the modeling
and analysis of the U.S. NAVSTAR system. We also discuss the combat modeling
simulation tool selected for this research along with some related studies and conclude
with an introduction to the combat scenario we are studying.
2.2 Global Positioning System (GPS)
NAVSTAR GPS provides positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) through a 32
linked satellite system flying in six equally spaced medium Earth orbit (MEO) orbital
planes circling the Earth twice a day. The system is broken into three components, space,
control, and user.
The United States Air Force (USAF), with a commitment that 95% of the time there
are at minimum 24 operational GPS satellites, develops, maintains, and operates the
space component constellation. The solar powered satellites orbit at approximately
12,550 miles reaching speeds of 7,000 mph. The orbital planes housing the GPS
satellites contain four seats occupying baseline satellites. When three satellites are
“seen” by a GPS receiver, a 2D position (latitude and longitude) can be determined.
With four satellites, a 3D position (2D plus altitude) can be determined.
The control component is described as “a global network of ground facilities that
track the GPS satellites, monitor their transmissions, perform analyses, and send
5

commands and data to the constellation [1].” Figure 1 shows the current operational
control component.

Figure 1. Control Component [1]

The master control station (MCS) and alternate MCS provide command and control
of the system. They send and receive navigation messages, assess and preserve health
and accuracy of the satellite constellation, and reposition satellites to uphold an optimal
GPS constellation. The 16 monitoring stations track and collect atmospheric data,
range/carrier measurements, and navigation signals on the satellites and route this
information back to the MCS. The four ground antennas transmit command and control
to the satellites. The ground antennas are responsible for navigation data and processor
program uploads/retrievals, telemetry collection, command transmissions, anomaly
resolution, and early orbit support.

6

Military GPS and Civilian GPS differ in two areas. The first is in terms of enhanced
security and jamming resistance. The second area is the type of service. Standard
Positioning Service (SPS) is for civilian usage. SPS broadcasts on one frequency and is
able to pinpoint an object to within 330 feet. Higher quality SPS receivers with the
combination of augmentation systems are able to provide better than 11.5 feet horizontal
accuracy. Military uses Precise Positioning Service (PPS), which is encoded and
scrambled for security reasons. PPS broadcasts on two frequencies allowing for a
reduction in radio degradation allowing for an accuracy within 3 feet. Security and
jamming resistance will always be a staple of military GPS, but ongoing modernization
of the GPS is reducing the service accuracy gap between civilian and military.
Transmitter power for a satellite is only 50 watts or less. This is a huge factor in the
limitation and susceptibility of the system. With this low power atmospheric effect, sky
blockage, and receiver quality account for a few of the sources of GPS signal errors [1].
2.3 GPS Spoofing
GPS spoofing uses a signal to take over a GPS receiver. The signal then causes the
receiver to deliver false information on the true position of the receiver as dictated by the
attacker. Cavaleri remarks that “spoofing is more deceitful” due to the ability of the
attack to be unrecognizable which leads to false information being fed to the user [6].
Spoofing is divided into three categories, simple, intermediate, and sophisticated.
Figure 2 visually describes the differences between the three categories.

7

Figure 2. Spoofing Categories [7]

Figure 3 shows the effect of an intermediate attack.

Figure 3. Intermediate Spoofing Attack [7]

Spoofing is effective since the victim is normally unaware of the present attack. This
leads to there being no true countermeasures for spoofing because of its unassuming
effects. There has been study of an in-line RF device connecting to a GPS antenna,
which provides spoofing protection without upgrades to a legacy receiver. Signal quality
and autonomous integrity monitoring help in the detection and mitigation of spoofing [5].
8

Simple and cost effective countermeasures can be retrofitted on nearly all existing GPS
receivers, although this will not truly eliminate spoofing attacks [8]. This fact is
worrisome, but it also helps in understanding the spoofing attack itself. A successful
spoofing attack needs only a target for most assaults. A means of prevention understands
the requirements for a successful attack. Locations and precision for an infinite amount
of receivers being spoofed to a random location or even a satellite-lock takeover can be
identified based on whether the target is civilian or military [9]. This makes it a key
variable to study when evaluating GPS attacks.
2.4 GPS Jamming
GPS jamming is the use of a device to block, jam, or interfere with GPS systems
communications. The jammer is described as radio frequency transmitters that block or
interfere with authorized communications.
Jamming can be done mechanically or electronically. Various mechanical jamming
devices are chaffs and corner reflectors. Chaffs and reflectors, which have the same
effect come in different shapes, reflect frequencies to produce false navigation solutions.
The more common jammers are electronic which are primarily barrage, spot, and
sweep. Barrage jamming sends noise out to multiple receivers at once. While it can
affect more targets, the effect is less pronounced due to the increase in spread. Sweep
jamming also affects multiple targets, but not simultaneously. It shifts from one target to
the next. Spot jamming focuses on only one target. These jamming techniques can be
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upgraded to other types of jamming such as base jamming, which is barrage jamming at
one radar attacking all of its frequencies.
Countermeasures are used to combat jamming. These are more widely known due to
the ease and availability of jammers compared to spoofers. Countermeasure techniques
are constantly alternating a frequency used, cloaking outgoing signals with random noise,
and effective operator training. [1]
GPS signals have lower power signals, making them highly susceptible to
interference by intentional and by unintentional means such as radio transmissions [10].
This makes it a key variable to study when evaluating GPS attacks.
2.5 Simulation
Simulation is a useful tool in running multiple tests without sizeable cost, time, or
resource impact. As an example, [4] used simulation to understand the effect of spoofing
signals by observing the chip delay of a spoofing signal using code and frequency
tracking as a response. The steps used for the simulation is to generate an intermediate
spoofing signal; the spoofers synch the spoofed signal with the current signal; the GPS
signal receives the spoofing signal and then processes it as the correct signal; and the
tracking loop error is generated and a “pseudo-range” is established according to the chip
delay of the spoofing signal. The navigation solution is then checked to see if it has been
adversely affected by the spoofing signal. [4]
One common analysis technique used with simulation-based analysis is Design of
Experiments (DOE). Unlike industrial DOE, simulation DOE does not need to use a
10

fractional design; can generate multiple replications without significant cost; there is no
need to randomize the runs; and there is greater control over factors within the
experiment. [11]
2.6 Regression/Design of Experiments
A common experimental design is a 2k design; where there are k factors being
observed in a low/high setting. The analysis of this resulting design often leads to a
regression equation. The equation can allow for better understanding of the design. The
equation becomes a predictive model where significant factors and their coefficients are
statistically known. [12]
Additionally a response surface can be gleaned from the regression equation. The
response surface is a geometric figure of the predictive model. It can show the entire
surface of a response based on its factors in a design space (often in two-dimensional
views). This can be extremely helpful in optimization as well as in understanding a
process. [13]
2.7 SEAS and Related Studies
With its initial release in 1994, System Effectiveness Analysis Simulation (SEAS)
provides “a constructive modeling and simulation tool that enables mission-level Military
Utility Analysis (MUA)…created to support developmental planning and Pre-Milestone
“A” acquisition decisions for military space systems. [14]” It provides agent-based
modeling that can be manipulated with programmable rules within a physics based battle
environment. It is currently in use by the Space and Missiles System Center, Air Force
11

Space Command, Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Institute of Technology,
U.S. Air Force Academy, National Reconnaissance Office, Army Space and Missile
Defense Command, and Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet within the DoD. It also is in use
by DoD contractors to include Lockheed Martin, The Boeing Company, and Northrop
Grumman. [14]
AFIT has done studies using SEAS. Due to the development of computer networks
as an integral part of information flow in combat, research is ongoing to gauge the
effectiveness and efficiency of this domain. Honaburger [15] uses SEAS to explore
network centric warfare (NCW) metrics in military worth analysis. His analysis looks at
measures that are import to successful NCW in a Kosovo scenario such as target
detection distance outputs, average communication channel message-loading metrics, and
target kills to understand better the cognitive domain.
Our study uses SMC/XR’s SEAS model [16] to present an urban canyon scenario
where PNT is highly stressed. It describes a special operations force (SOF) team trying
to recover a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) against a red military force. The team
uses GPS to lead themselves from an initial drop point to the WMD and back to an
evacuation point while trying to avoid red forces. [16]
2.8 Summary
GPS is a tool that military and civilian organizations use for a myriad of purposes.
Beginning with NAVSTAR ran by the USAF, both civilian and militarily share the same
system from the control component down to the receivers. Although alike in nearly
12

every area, military application has the advantage of enhanced security and jamming
resistance. Since GPS is such an important tool, attacks against users of the system is a
given where the most well known are jamming and spoofing. Jamming involves
mechanical or electronic means to block or interfere with communications. In spoofing,
attackers feed false information to receivers causing positional errors. Spoofing is
considered more deceitful since the victim is typically unaware of the attack.
Simulation is a helpful tool in understanding the way a system works without the
heavy resource burden that affects other testing means. SEAS is a combat simulation
tool that models mission level activities. We briefly describe a SEAS model built by
SMC/XR [16] to analyze PNT performance in an urban canyon environment. In Chapter
4, we use this model to explore further the effects of GPS jamming and spoofing for this
scenario. Our analysis uses DOE to allow an efficient and effective way to test across an
entire operating space. In addition, we develop predictive equations and response
surfaces from the simulation outputs retrieved from our experiments to provide a better
understanding of how jamming and spoofing effect a PNT system.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Introduction
SEAS is used to model the effects of jamming and spoofing on military operations.
The ability to repeat and to explore a large number of different scenarios within an
experimental design helps to find adequate results; this is a benefit that a simulation
provides. SMC/XR models a scenario that uses SEAS, which depicts a recovery mission
by a SOF team using GPS [16]. We start with this model and vary selected input
parameters to characterize a degradation in PNT performance due to jamming and
spoofing effects. A number of output statistics are collected as responses for the detailed
study.
3.2 Background
SMC/XR, the SEAS model managers along with SAIC and ExoAnalytic
Solutions presented a study at the Military Operations Research Society Symposium
(MORSS) in 2009 [16]. The focus area captured in their study is the urban canyon
environment. This environment is marred by GPS gaps such as tall buildings and indoor
locations. The measures of performance (MOP) used as factors were developed from
STRATCOM PNT Joint Capabilities Document and Functional Solutions Analysis and
AFSPC Space Force Enhancement FY08 Mission Area Plan [17]. The three MOPs
pulled from these documents are availability (assured access to PNT in any condition or
environment), accuracy (conformance between a measured and a true PNT parameter),
and timeliness (determine if PNT need is met within user defined time parameter) [16].
14

The blue goal in the scenario is to recover a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) from
terrorists (red force) located in a target building. The simulation unfolds with SOF team
(blue forces) in the target building, recovering the WMD, and maneuvering to the
extraction point. PNT is used to navigate and avoid red force and local police. The
model behavior is gleaned from the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory Instructions,
the Army Infantryman Input, and historical operations [18]. Major results from the study
are “time lost correlates linearly with the availability of navigation sources, there is a
knee in the mission success curve as availability passes 70%, and a distinct floor and
shelf indicate that the availability of PNT potentially doubles mission success.” [16]
3.3 Measures of Effectiveness
A key piece of constructing the model involved developing measures of effect
(MOE) selected from the Joint Staff’s Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) [19]. These
MOEs are percent of friendly causalities, friendly forces movement delays in hours, and
time to seize objectives. For this study, we use multiple MOEs to capture degradation of
the PNT system, which are time to mission completion, number of blue team killed,
number of engagements, and number of GPS minutes lost.
3.4 Model Behavior
The model focuses on a location in the Middle East between a blue force and a
red force. The blue force is made up of Air Force, Navy, and Army units. The red force
is made up of the civilians, police, and red military. A screen shot of the model running
is shown in Figure 4.
15

Figure 4. Initial Phase of SEAS Scenario

The Air Force hierarchy, shown in Figure 5, consists of Predators, Global Hawks,
and CV-22s. In this scenario, they provide no offensive capability. The remotely piloted
aircrafts (RPAs) only deliver sensor and communication ability that highlights and
16

distinguishes red forces. The CV-22 delivers and picks up blue forces with a constant
evacuation time. The Navy unit is a carrier with its mission to deploy and receive the Air
Force’s helicopter. [16]

Figure 5. Blue Hierarchy

The Army consists of squad leaders and soldiers. The squad leader is a solider
with the ability to issue commands. There are 50 soldiers in the SOF team with no more
than four groups at one time. The soldier is armed with M-16s, night vision, PNT device,
17

blue tracking, and a radio. A soldier does not engage the enemy unless fired upon, but
when engaged, continues engagement until all enemies are killed, enemies flee, or until
an order to retreat is given. The blue unit ignores civilians and avoids the police force.
The max range of sight for a blue force member is 200 meters. Movement speed is
variable and only on foot. The max speed is 5.25 mph. When a soldier is killed, the
nearest soldier carries the dead soldier. There is no delay if one soldier is carried, but if
two soldiers are being carried then the speed of the soldier is reduced by 25%. [16]
There are 31 GPS units assigned to the blue force. For this scenario, each unit is
available. GPS units follow actual unclassified orbits but do not model any signal traffic.
The blue GPS unit under SOF team represents a GPS receiver and simply counts the
number of satellites visible to the SOF team every time step. PNT system performance
and degradation is captured through use of the timeliness, accuracy, and availability. [16]
The red military has six platoons housing multiple soldiers each. Each soldier is
armed with a radio, night vision, and a rifle. Trucks move soldiers to a combat area.
There are six trucks with 11 soldiers per truck. Forces can join to create larger forces.
When retreating, red soldiers retreat as a group, always in the opposite direction of the
SOF team. The red soldiers gather information through police chatter, although the
groups are not in collusion. There is an initial lag time of 30 minutes from the first police
call to when red soldiers move from their base. When traveling in trucks max speed is 45
mph. When traveling on foot max speed is 5.25 mph. Their max sight range is 200
meters. [16]

18

The police force has six stations each housing multiple police officers. Each
officer has a radio and a pistol. There are five police officers per station. Police are on
scheduled regular patrols within a vicinity of their assigned police station. They do not
engage unless attacked. For this scenario, if fired upon, the police run away. Their max
speed on foot is 5 mph, on motorcycle is 50 mph, and in station wagon is 50 mph. Their
max sight range is 50 meters. [16]
The civilians are non-offensive units that are only located downtown. At the start
of the mission, there are 20 civilians on the street. A random counter adds more civilians
the longer the campaign goes along, where 20 more civilians are added each hour. If
engaged, civilians run in random directions. There is a 50% chance they call the police,
where the location information takes 5 minutes to enter police chatter. Tactical
Programming Language (TPL) for this logic is shown in Figure 6.

19

Figure 6. Civilian Protocol

The scenario follows the outline shown in Figure 7 and discussed below. The
blue forces are deployed to the drop off location. The special operations forces (SOF)
team then makes its way to the building housing the WMD. The SOF team clears the
building and recovers the WMD. No SOF team or enemy forces will enter a building
once the WMD is recovered. WMD recovery begins the evacuation phase.
3.5 Engagement Criteria
There are three unique engagement criteria during the scenario. During the
“Enemy Fights” criteria, the red soldiers always engage the SOF team. During an attack,
if needed the red units wait for reinforcements. If at any point the enemy military force
does not outnumber the SOF team at least 3 to 1, then the red soldiers disengage and
retreat. This engagement criterion is the “Enemy Runs Away” and is triggered by the
20

SOF team killing at least 50% of the red soldiers. The enemy forces always shadow the
SOF team until reinforcements have arrived. The last criterion is when the SOF team
retreats. This occurs when the red force kills greater than 50% of the SOF team. The
SOF team never fully leaves as it still keeps it mission of recovering and delivering the
WMD.
3.6 Evacuation Criteria
The evacuation point is where the CV-22 picks up and recovers the WMD and
teams. At this location, there can be no more than 3 to 1 red units on location or there
can be no pick up. The CV-22 could come under heavy fire and evacuation will not be
possible. The CV-22 evacuation delay time is constant and its PNT is not degraded.
There are two defined evacuation points in the model where the SOF team moves
towards the closest from route taken which varies with engagements and other factors.
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Figure 7. Urban Operations Vignette [16]

3.7 Selected Measures
For the purpose of this model, the three inputs are availability and accuracy,
which are measures for a jamming capability, and timeliness, which is a measure for
spoofing. This study looks at these variables to assess what jamming and spoofing does
to mission success. Does jamming have a bigger effect on mission success or is spoofing
the more problematic attack? What is the response depending on the overall modeled
area for jamming and spoofing? These questions are what the study looks to answer.
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Although availability and accuracy are grouped to describe the jamming capability, all
three variables are systematically changed during the experiment.
The inputs are continuous variables. Accuracy is conformance between a
measured and a true PNT parameter, where the position error measured in meters,
ranging from one to 100, where one is the most accurate. Availability is the assured
access to PNT in any condition or environment ranging from zero to one, where one is
fully available. Timeliness, the time to recover a lost signal, is measured in seconds,
ranging from five to 360, where five is the best timeliness for our scenario.
Responses are mission success, time to mission success, number of blue team
killed, number of engagements, and amount of time with no satellite GPS signal. The
responses are discrete or continuous. Time to mission success is a continuous response
measured in minutes, with the determination of it being accepted for analysis based on if
there is a mission success. Number of blue team killed and number of engagements are
discrete values. Amount of time with no satellite GPS signal is a continuous response in
minutes.
3.8 Constant Measures
The other parameters varied in the SMC study [16] are held constant for our study
to focus on effects of jamming and spoofing at different levels for our selected responses.
For our scenario there are two predators used to help the blue forces identify red forces.
The police do not join the fight. There is a 3-minute delay by blue forces when initially
dropped off at the starting location.
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3.9 Analysis Approach
To understand fully any effect of each factor, a DOE is employed. The DOE is a
5k design, where the response is measured at combination of unique levels for each of the
k factors. An empirical model is created and tested for model parameter significance by
p-values while confirming assumptions such as constant variance and normality. A
response surface is then made comparing variables to one or multiple responses.
3.10 Verification and Validation
Confirmatory runs are used to verify that the predictions received from the
experiment are valid. Many times an estimated optimal setting is used to verify whether
the response surface or prediction formula meets the goal of the experiment. Since this is
a simulation, the environment of the experiment is the same and at least three runs are
normally sufficient. In addition, consultation with subject matter experts (SMEs) and
comparison to past data are used for verification and validation.
3.11 Summary
We describe an SMC/XR scenario built with SEAS where PNT is highly stressed as a
SOF team recovers a WMD from a red force using GPS. Our study uses this scenario to
understand and capture the degradation of the PNT system due to spoofing and jamming.
We model spoofing and jamming by varying availability, accuracy, and timeliness
parameters as factors in our DOE to characterize the system. The scenario uses a blue
force made up of Air Force, Navy, and Army units against a red force comprised of
civilians, police, and a red military force. GPS units used by blue forces in the model do
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not use actual GPS signals, but count the number of satellites visible to the SOF team
every time step. The DOE discussed in Chapter 4 produces the data used to create a
prediction model and response surfaces for comparing variables effect on responses. An
in-depth look at two replications provides additional insight and serves as an additional
verification and validation tool.
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IV. Analysis
4.1 Overview
This chapter outlines the analysis approach used and provides the results of the
DOE. The chapter examines four responses: time to complete the mission, SOF team
members killed, number of engagements, and the number of minutes the GPS signal is
lost. Where applicable, confirmatory runs and response surfaces are used to validate the
prediction models. This chapter also compares the two jamming components,
availability, and accuracy, to the spoofing component of timeliness.
4.2 Setting up the DOE
Initially a setup of the variable space is needed to focus the experiment. The goal
of the experiment is to see meaningful change in the design. Setting all of the variables at
high points would not produce a meaningful design, as there would not be a better
understanding of the reduction in PNT. Likewise setting all of the variables at the low
points would only serve to show what going into a combat zone blind would entail.
Since GPS has become integrated in many aspects of both civilian and military products,
setting all variables at the low point would not provide much knowledge for this
experiment. A 10% reduction is taken from the high and low points to show what the
variation in PNT produces. To understand better this variation, replication runs are
included in the experiment. The more test points collected is always better. Even though
there is not a monetary expense associated with this simulation, time is a concern. On
average for this simulation, the SEAS simulation tool takes an hour to do 50 runs, with
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runs experiencing heavier losses taking longer. We set a budget of 1000 runs for the
study. To balance the amount of design points with replications, the level of the DOE
was considered. A 43 full factorial model requires 64 runs, while a 53 full factorial model
requires 125 runs. Increasing the number of levels gives a better understanding of the
complete design space. To maximize time and design points a decision between a 43 with
15 replications or a 53 with 8 replications is made. Ultimately, the ability to understand
better the design space is the reason that the 53 design is chosen.
4.3 Design
Table 1 shows the 53 design space in engineering units along with the coded units.
The coded space maps the engineering units to the range -1 to 1. This yields orthogonal
columns, which means all the elements in the column sum to zero.
Table 1. Design Space
Accuracy Availability Timeliness
Engineering Values
10
0.1
36
30
0.3
108
50
0.5
180
70
0.7
252
90
0.9
324
Coded Space
1
-1
1
0.5
-0.5
0.5
0
0
0
-0.5
0.5
-0.5
-1
1
-1
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4.4 Results Introduction
After running the simulation, the experimental results contain 1000 runs, which is
a five level DOE with three factors and eight replications. Eighty of these runs caused
erratic results in the simulation. Low availability appears to be the cause of distress.
These resulted in high completion times and abnormally high minutes lost for the GPS
signal. These runs were removed since the results do not give accurate readings at the
affected levels. Overall, 46 design points are affected. These design points have between
three and seven replications. The remaining 920 runs make up the data analyzed.
The average and standard deviation rates realized by each factor, accuracy,
availability, and timeliness, at each level are recorded in Table 2, Table 3, and Table 4,
respectively.
Table 2. Average and Standard Deviation Accuracy Results

10
262.29
Time
± 170.90
32.82
Blue Killed
± 6.07
11.41
Number of Engagements
± 2.24
173.20
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
± 167.06

30
382.53
± 227.73
33.41
± 5.98
11.80
1.88
295.26
± 225.62
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Accuracy
50
70
388.977 401.81
± 234.33 ± 248.95
32.07
32.63
± 5.63 ± 5.94
11.91
12.01
± 1.81 ± 1.92
305.28 318.85
± 230.88 ± 247.98

90
401.76
± 227.57
33.67
± 5.87
11.92
± 1.70
317.49
± 227.56

Table 3. Average and Standard Deviation Availability Results

0.1
393.10
Time
± 238.26
32.87
Blue Killed
± 5.63
11.80
Number of Engagements
± 1.71
308.16
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
± 235.80

Availability
0.3
0.5
0.7
389.61 375.98 345.72
± 232.47 ± 228.94 ± 227.57
33.32
32.66
32.91
± 6.12 ± 5.56 ± 6.35
11.98
11.70
11.79
± 1.91 ± 1.87
±2.21
304.07 288.72 259.41
± 230.67 ± 228.10 ± 226.77

0.9
324.51
± 210.04
32.83
± 5.93
11.74
± 1.93
242.06
± 210.06

Table 4. Average and Standard Deviation Timeliness Results
Timeliness
36
108
180
252
171.35 300.49 380.09 471.91
Time
± 91.14 ± 190.58 ± 206.35 ± 207.50
33.00
33.36
32.91
32.39
Blue Killed
± 6.00 ± 6.18 ± 5.91 ± 5.86
10.97
11.57
12.02
12.38
Number of Engagements
± 2.10 ± 1.99 ± 1.71 ± 1.70
72.00
216.17 297.96 392.13
Minutes GPS Signal Lost
± 69.08 ± 180.22 ± 200.80 ± 205.06

324
554.30
± 219.44
32.83
± 5.57
12.25
± 1.74
472.85
± 218.92

Based on these results, an initial conjecture is made concerning the effect of
individual factors on each response. Looking at the Accuracy factor, the time the SOF
team runs the mission and the average minutes that GPS signal is lost appear to be
affected by the accuracy factor. For the Availability factor, time and minutes GPS signal
lost might again appear to be affected. Time and minutes GPS signal lost also appear to
be affected by the timeliness factor.
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Although the tables provide a general understanding of the effect of individual
factors on each response, the standard deviation on for each measurement is large. This
is due to the wide range for each measurement. One level of a factor is also accounting
for all levels of the other two factors. To get a better view, confidence intervals of each
factor split by the other factors are plotted against the two responses that appear to be
affected, time and minutes GPS signal lost in Figure 8 - Figure 13. All confidence
intervals are constructed independently at the 95% level. In each figure, the best settings
for all factors are in the lower right corner and worst settings in upper left corner.
Looking at the Figure 8 - Figure 10, a high level Timeliness generates a lower time no
matter what setting the other factors are set at. Such a blanket statement cannot be said
about the other two factors. The same holds true for Figure 11 - Figure 13, where a high
level of timeliness produces a lower amount of lost GPS signal minutes, no matter the
settings of the other two factors. Since timeliness corresponds directly to spoofing in our
study, these initial results indicate a larger impact from spoofing than jamming. To
understand fully the effect of each factor a regression analysis and a response surface
analysis is conducted.
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Figure 8. Time Confidence Interval (Timeliness Base)

Figure 8 shows much less effect on timeliness when both availability and
accuracy are at the highest levels. With any degradation in availability or accuracy,
timeliness shows significant increases going from low to high levels.
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Figure 9. Time Confidence Interval (Availability Base)
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In Figure 9, we see the most effect across levels of availability when accuracy is
at the best level and timeliness at the worst.

Figure 10. Time Confidence Interval (Accuracy Base)
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Figure 10 shows a significant increase in time with an accuracy increase from 10
– 30 meters at degraded levels of timeliness and availability. There also seems to be a
significant drop in time when accuracy is at its highest level and timeliness is greater than
108 seconds.
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Figure 11. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Timeliness Base)

Just as in Figure 8, there is little effect across levels of timeliness in Figure 11 at
the best setting for availability and accuracy. With any degradation in availability or
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accuracy, we see a significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with increases in
timeliness.

Figure 12. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Availability Base)
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Figure 12 shows little effect across levels of availability at the best setting for
timeliness and accuracy. With any degradation in timeliness or accuracy, we see a
significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with increases in timeliness.

Figure 13. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Confidence Interval (Accuracy Base)
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Figure 13 results show a significant increase in GPS signal minutes lost with an
accuracy increase from 10 – 30 meters at degraded levels of timeliness and availability.
There also seems to be a significant drop in GPS signal minutes lost when accuracy is at
its highest level and timeliness is greater than 108 seconds.
4.5 Time Response
We initially construct a model with time as the response for the full factorial
design. Looking at the residual by predicted plot in Figure 14, a transformation made
sense since the plot took on a funneling shape and not a random even spread across a
median. A Box-Cox Transformations analysis shown in Figure 15, is performed and a
value of -0.2 is pulled from the analysis. This value being close to zero is interpreted as a
Log transformation on the response variable.
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Figure 14. Initial Time Residual by Predicted Plot

Figure 15. Initial Time Box-Cox Transformations Analysis

Using the transformation and stepwise analysis, we first notice potential signs for
higher order terms with the Actual by Predicted plot in Figure 16. The predicted model,
shown in Figure 17, contains higher order terms, as indicated from Figure 16. The lack
of fit test along with the response surface shows the model contains higher order terms.
Model adequacy checking indicates that a constant variance and normality assumption
are both reasonable.

39

Figure 16. Log (Time) Actual by Predicted Plot

Figure 17. Log (Time) Parameter Estimates

The goal is to minimize the amount of time the SOF team needs to complete the
mission, so referring to Figure 18, setting all variables to their highest levels (Accuracy,
Availability, Timeliness) = (10, 0.9, 36) results in a time within the interval {70.3718,
85.8437} 95% of the time.
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Figure 18. Time Prediction Profiler

To validate this response five validation runs are made, with all factors at their
high levels for all runs. Table 5 lists the results. Across the entire run, the range is 82.95
to 88.55 with an overall average of 85.44. This lines up with the prediction model.
Notice also in Figure 18, we see a slight decrease in mission time for improvements in all
three factors.
Table 5. Time Validation Runs
Run Time Average
1
88.55
2
82.95
3
85.6 85.44
4
83.2
5
86.9
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A response surface helps to understand better how the variables influence the
response. Figure 19 is the response surface for Accuracy and Availability using the Time
response variable. The surface indicates a stationary ridge. This is great news for
understanding the model, as there is a line maximum of 431 for the design space of
accuracy and availability. In essence, there is little change in the response as we move
along the line maximum. The minimum point for this design space is 123 at the
maximum levels for both variables. Figure 20 and Figure 21 represent the response
surfaces for accuracy and timeliness as well as timeliness and availability. These two are
both rising ridges, where there is essentially a rising slope within the design space. For
both models, the maximum value is at the low levels for both design variables and the
high design variables produce the minimum value being 83 and 113 minutes,
respectively.
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Figure 19. Time Accuracy vs Availability Response Surface
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Figure 20. Time Accuracy vs Timeliness Response Surface
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Figure 21. Time Timeliness vs Availability Response Surface

4.6 Blue Team Killed Response
When examining the blue killed response, no “good” model is apparent. After
going through all model types, the best model in terms of R2, ANOVA p-value, and
parameter fits is Figure 22. Looking at the Actual by Predicted Plot, the values appear in
vertical line. Also looking at the averages of blue killed by factors, Table 2 – Table 4, the
factors look have little to no effect. Statistically, PNT has no effect on the number of
SOF team killed during the mission.
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Figure 22. Blue Killed Summary of Fit

Figure 23. Blue Killed Parameter Estimates

4.7 Number of Engagements Response
Examining the number of engagements, Figure 25 provides the predicted model.
The model contains only accuracy and timeliness, as availability was not a significant
factor in the modeling of the number of engagements. Referring to Figure 24, the R2 as
well as the R2adj are extremely low. This indicates a poor fit of the actual data to the

predicted model. No further analysis for this response is conducted.
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Figure 24. Number of Engagements Summary of Fit

Figure 25. Number of Engagements Parameter Estimates

4.8 Minutes GPS Signal Lost Response
We initially construct a model with GPS signal minutes lost as the response for
our full factorial design. Looking at the residual by predicted plot, Figure 26, a
transformation made sense since the plot took on a funneling shape and not a random
spread across a median. A Box-Cox Transformations analysis, Figure 27, is performed
and a value of zero is recommended. This value is interpreted as a Log transformation on
the response variable.
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Figure 26. Initial GPS Minutes Lost Residual by Predicted Plot

Figure 27. Initial GPS Minutes Lost Box-Cox Transformations Analysis

Figure 28. Log (GPS Minutes Lost) Actual by Predicted Plot
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Figure 29. Log (GPS Minutes Lost) Parameter Estimates

Using the transformation and stepwise analysis, we first notice potential signs for
higher order terms with the Actual by Predicted plot in Figure 28. The predicted model,
provided in Figure 29, contains higher order terms, as indicated in Figure 28. The lack of
fit test along with the response surface indicates the model contains higher order terms.
Model adequacy checking indicates that a constant variance and normality assumption
are both reasonable.
The goal is to minimize the amount of GPS Minutes Lost during the SOF team’s
mission. Referring to Figure 30, setting all variables to their highest levels (Accuracy,
Availability, Timeliness) = (10, 0.9, 36) results in a minutes lost within the interval
{12.3917, 16.2348} 95% of the time.
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Figure 30. GPS Minutes Lost Prediction Profiler

To validate this response five validation runs are made, with all factors at their
high levels for all runs. Table 6 lists the results. Across the entire run, the range is 10.85
to 14.5 with an overall average of 12.48. Although the three lowest runs are below the
predicted range, the average falls within the prediction model.
Table 6. GPS Minutes Lost Validation Runs
Run Time Average
1
11.75
2
14.5
3
13.4 12.48
4
10.85
5
11.9
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A response surface helps to understand better the variables effect on the response.
Figure 31 is the response surface of Accuracy and Availability for the GPS Minutes Lost
response variable. The surface forms a saddle point. The minimum point for this design
space is 38 at the maximum levels for both variables and the maximum point is at 401
minutes lost. Figure 32 and Figure 33 represent the response surfaces for timeliness and
accuracy as well as timeliness and availability, respectively. Both surfaces indicate a
maximum point within the design space. In Figure 32, the maximum value is within the
Accuracy range {45, 85} and within the Timeliness range {252, 324} producing, a value
of 555 minutes lost, and the high design variables produce the minimum value being 14
minutes lost. In Figure 33, the maximum value is within the Availability range {0.1,
0.55} and within the Timeliness range {230, 324} producing, a value of 582 minutes lost,
and the high design variables produce the minimum value being 26 minutes lost.
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Figure 31. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Accuracy vs Availability Response Surface

52

Figure 32. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Accuracy vs Timeliness Response Surface
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Figure 33. GPS Signal Minutes Lost Timeliness vs Availability Response Surface

4.9 Individual Run
We decided to look at two additional individual runs to gain more insight and to
validate further. The first run depicted in Figure 34, is a mission totaling 72.8 minutes
with only two engagements, 15 blue units killed, and 32.45 minutes from lost GPS signal.
For this run, the factors are high (1) for accuracy, medium-high (0.5) for availability, and
medium-high (0.5) for timeliness. The SOF team recovered successfully the WMD
before being detected and engaged. During the run, PNT issues did not occur until after
recovering of the WMD, but lasted until the end of the mission.
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Figure 34. Individual Run #226

To check the other spectrum, we examined a mission where PNT was stressed.
Figure 35 shows a low (-1) accuracy setting, a medium (0) availability setting, and a low
(-1) timeliness setting. This produced a time of 872.55 minutes with 11 engagements, 44
blue members killed, and 819.65 minutes lost from GPS signal. PNT issues occurred
throughout the run from start to end. Unlike the previous run, the SOF team took fire
well before recovering the WMD. Figure 36 depicts the beginning of the mission. It
shows that PNT issues began about 15 minutes into the mission with the first engagement
occurring a little after 20 minutes from drop-off.
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Figure 35. Individual Run #984 (Entire)

Figure 36. Individual Run #984 (0-60 minutes)

4.10 Overall Findings
This research employed a 53 full factorial model with eight replications for a 1000
run data set. Eighty of these runs caused erratic results in the simulation and were
removed, however all 125 data points had at least three replications. The results clearly
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show PNT has a significant effect on mission statistics. Of the MOEs studied, blue
members killed and number of engagements did not produce a significant predictive
model, which means that the three MOPs used for this research did not significantly
affect these two effective measurements.
The MOE, time to complete the mission, produced a significant predictive model.
This model includes higher order terms due to the exponential spike in the response as
PNT began to degrade. This model contains all three MOPs. Spoofing, represented by
the performance measurement, timeliness, maintains the highest individual coefficient in
the model. A higher coefficient means that a given value influences the model more than
a smaller coefficient. When combining the jamming effects and looking at the
percentage added to the model, jamming has a slight 53% to 47% edge over spoofing.
Jamming has a higher effect on the timing measurement.
The other significant model produced by the model, number of minutes GPS signal
lost, also included higher order terms due to the exponential spike in the actual data. This
model also contains all three MOPs. As with the timing measurement, timeliness again
had the highest single effect on the model. When combining the jamming effects,
jamming for a second time has the slight edge of 54% to 46% over spoofing. Jamming
once more has the higher effect on the total GPS signal minutes lost.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Overview
This thesis uses a model presented at MORSS by SMC/XR to study the effects of
PNT in an urban canyon environment. The overall mission involves a blue SOF team
recovering a WMD from a red military force that includes local police and civilians with
the help of GPS units. Three MOPs are studied, availability and accuracy representing
jamming, and timeliness representing spoofing. The MOEs to understand the effects of
PNT are time to complete the mission, blue forces killed, number of engagements, and
the number of minutes lost by the GPS signal.
This chapter summarizes the results of the analysis conducted using simulation,
DOE, and RSM statistical tools. In addition, recommendations for improvement and
suggestions for future research are included.
5.2 Analysis Conclusions
The analysis clearly shows that PNT can directly and significantly influence a
mission. Of the response variables monitored, the SOF team members killed and
numbers of engagements responses were not statistically significant for our selected PNT
MOEs. The prediction models included higher order terms due to the exponential spike
in the responses as PNT began to degrade.
With the timing of the mission, all input variables were included in the model
with timeliness having the biggest coefficient in the model. This held true looking at the
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individual variable averages across their levels as timeliness had the biggest and most
definite spike, although combined jamming, both availability and accuracy, had the
greater effect. The SOF team had the lowest mission time when all factors were at their
highest level. Confirmatory runs validated the prediction interval.
GPS signal minutes lost is related to all factors. The prediction model includes all
three inputs at varying degrees. The coefficient for timeliness once again had the highest
coefficient in the model with the combined jamming having the greater effect. The GPS
receiver lost the fewest minutes when all factors were at their highest levels.
Confirmatory runs validated the prediction interval.
Within the two prediction models, timeliness is the largest coefficient for all
models. Timeliness, representing the spoofing capability, has the largest single influence
for these two responses in this design. When combining all terms in the model, jamming,
which includes both availability and accuracy terms, has the larger effect slightly over
spoofing for both models.
An effective predictive model was established for two of the MOEs, time and lost
number of GPS signal minutes. The models produced response surfaces that generated a
better understanding of the variables and their relationship to the response. For the time
response, a stationary ridge was produced for the factors accuracy and availability. This
tells us that no matter the level of availability, if accuracy is between 30 to 70 meters,
there is little effect on the maximum time produced. The other variations, timeliness vs
accuracy, and timeliness vs availability produce a rising ridge where essentially there is a
slope, the higher the level of the factor, the lower the time.
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For the GPS signal minutes lost, a saddle point is produced for accuracy and
availability. The saddle pint is very shallow, really more of a stationary ridge. For the
accuracy factor between 30 to 70 meters produces a high minute lost no matter the
availability. The other variations, timeliness vs accuracy, and timeliness vs availability
produce a rising ridge where essentially there is a slope, the higher the level of the factor,
the lower the minutes lost.
The individual runs provided additional insight from selected replications and
cemented the predictive models established. Number of engagements and blue killed did
not seem to factor. With both responses, time and minutes lost, the higher the levels of
all factors, the better these two responses were.
5.3 Recommendations for Improvements
As with any type of research and analysis, more data is paramount to better
information. This research employed an unbiased 53 model with eight replications at
most design points. With a larger model and more replications, a more detailed view of
the model space could be achieved. This may yield a better understanding of the number
of blue members killed as well as the number of engagements. In addition, a better
model could be established for the timing and GPS minutes lost measurements.
Continuing with the data improvements, the eighty runs lost could be ran again to better
understand the design space.
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5.4 Future Work
Many potential future routes are available to continue this research. The police and
civilians in the scenario are only used as eyes for the red military. A DOE could be
employed to see what effects a combat engaged police force would have in the scenario.
Another approach could be looking at different MOEs to model. Additional MOEs
could be if the SOF team is detected prior to exiting the building housing the WMD, was
there a change to the evacuation plan, what is the chosen evacuation plan, and if the
mission was a success or failure.
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